

Rethinking Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy as a Nation Branding Project

*Kadir Jun Ayhan**

South Korea's (hereafter Korea) recent middle power diplomacy has attracted worldwide attention. Korean administrations have attempted to steer the country along a middle power path, where it can play a more active global role that is commensurate with the size of its economy. Most accounts take Korea's self-declared identity as a middle power for granted; that is, they do not evaluate the non-conforming data. On the other hand, this paper traces the process of why the country projects a middle power identity. This paper first addresses alternative explanations of the positional, behavioral and identity approaches to answer this question. Following the failure of these explanations, this paper proposes that Korea's more assertive projection of its proclaimed middle power identity was a nation branding project that aimed to tackle the so-called Korea discount and to achieve its aspired place in the global prestige and status hierarchy. In turn, Korea envisioned its improved standing in the world helping it achieve its preferred global outcomes, particularly in shaping a favorable international environment surrounding the country.

Key Words: South Korea, middle power, nation branding, global governance, international status

I. Introduction

The topic of middle powers has not been mainstream in International Relations theory. However, the G20's recent ascent to becoming a main platform for global governance has revived interest in middle powers. South Korea (hereafter Korea), an active member of G20, assertively projects itself as a middle power and self-declared

* Hankuk University of Foreign Studies; E-mail: kadirayhan@gmail.com

"middle power diplomacy"¹ (MOFA 2014a, 3) has become a vital aspect of the country's foreign policy.

Most studies on Korea's middle power diplomacy point to Korean government's official rhetoric as evidence of the country's middle power behavior (see e.g. Cha and Dumond 2017; Kim 2014a; Kim 2015b; Kim 2015a; Ko 2012; Lee 2012c; Lee 2012b; Lee 2016; Nye 2009; O'Donnell 2015; Saxer 2013; Sohn 2015; Song 2016). That is, they fail to go beyond a descriptive analysis of what Korean government purport the country to be as opposed to investigating the countries' foreign policy behavior in comparison to other countries. These studies neglect the more important question of whether Korea is, indeed, a middle power and, instead, they take it for granted. Further, the question of why Korea aspires to assume and project a middle power role and identity remains understudied.

This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature and traces the process of Korea's projection of a middle power identity. First, it addresses alternative explanations of why Korea projects a middle power identity, namely positional, behavioral, functional and identity approaches. In particular, Korea's foreign policy behavior is analyzed to see if the country's middle power rhetoric reflects the behavior and functions that would be expected from a "traditional middle power" (Jordaan 2003).² An analysis of the non-conforming data, which previous studies on Korea's middle power diplomacy neglected, shows a discrepancy between Korea's rhetoric and its behavior as a middle power. Why Korea assertively projects a middle power identity remains a puzzle, since its behavior cannot explain it. This paper proposes that Korea's self-identification as a middle power has mainly been a nation branding effort enabled by its increasing positional capacity in terms of its economic and military power.

The data used in this study were obtained from primary official documents such as Diplomatic White Papers, presidential policy papers, speeches and writings of presidents and ministers.

This paper is organized as follows. In section two, the conceptual framework is built; it conceptualizes the terms middle power and nation branding and incorporates them within the research question. It also lays out this paper's proposition that Korea's projection of a middle power identity is a nation branding project. Section three addresses alternative explanations for Korea's assertive projection of a middle power

1 The author prefers the concept of "middle power statecraft" (Ping 2005) over "middle power diplomacy" as the former reflects the nature of foreign policy behavior better. However, both concepts are used interchangeably in this paper due to Korean government's frequent usage of the latter.

2 On the difference between traditional and emerging middle powers, see Jordaan (2003).

identity; it also includes a comparison between Korea's middle power rhetoric and its actual behavior. Section four analyzes why and how Korea projects itself as a middle power despite its shortcoming in terms of the requisite behavioral component. The concluding section summarizes the findings of the paper.

II. Conceptual Framework

A. Conceptualizing Middle Power

Mainstream International Relations theories often focus on systemic theory and, particularly, on the role of great powers (Mearsheimer 2014, 5; Waltz 1979, 73). However, middle powers have not attracted as much attention (Holbraad 1971, 77). Concerning the place of middle powers, positional approach, often realist accounts, focuses on states' positions in the world, based on such data as GDP, population and military strength (Holbraad 1971). Behavioral approach, often liberal institutionalist works, emphasizes the normative foreign policy behaviors of middle powers, such as their preference of multilateral solutions to transnational problems and advocacy for what is better for the world with moral authority and 'good international citizenship' (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993, 19; Henrikson 2005, 69-71). Functional approach, which is also mainly found in liberal institutionalist studies, emphasizes the specific roles that only middle powers can play by reason of their positional capacity and their willingness to take responsibility to contribute to world peace (Chapnick 2000, 195; Cooper 2011, 321; Riddell 1948, 11; Robertson 2017, 361). Identity approach, which are in line with constructivism, underlines countries' self-identification as middle powers and their behavior relative to this self-created narrative (Hurrell 2000; Teo 2017).³

B. Conceptualizing Nation Branding

In this paper, nation branding is understood as a government's strategic communication that aims to alter its nation's identity or image, including altering the beliefs about and emotions toward it, in a positive way (Gudjonsson 2005, 285; see also Buhmann 2016). Nation branding is about projecting a country's preferred identity and it reflects

3 For more extensive discussion on definitions of middle powers, see Carr (2014); Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal (1993); Holbraad (1971); Jordaan (2003, 2017); Ping (2005); Robertson (2017).

the country's interests and aspirations (Melissen 2005, 20). States that are not readily recognized as great or small powers spend relatively more effort in projecting their identities as middle powers, because stakes for their legitimacy and influence in world politics are higher (Henrikson 2005; Patience 2014; see also Cull 2018). This legitimacy is based on their material capabilities including economic and military power, but also on their "status" (Gilpin 1981; Renshon 2017), "prestige" (Khong 2019), "reputation" (Jervis 1970; Wang 2006), "standing" (Renshon 2017) and how they are imagined (Patience 2014) in the world.⁴ A country's standing in the world can, in turn, help it attain its preferred outcomes globally, including successfully collaborating with other states to achieve common goals and gain higher leverage when bargaining over significant issues that matter to the country (Gilpin 1981; Henrikson 2005; Khong 2019; Nye 2004; Patience 2014).

C. Research Question

In this paper, the main puzzle is to figure out why Korea projects itself as a middle power. In order to solve this puzzle, different approaches to studying middle powers are analyzed as alternative explanations.

The positional approach's explanation would be that Korea's projection of a middle power identity reflects only its positional capacity. The test for this alternative explanation is to determine whether Korea has identified itself as a middle power since establishing its position thus, based on its material resources.

The behavioral and functional approaches would argue that Korea projects its identity as a middle power as a reflection of its foreign policy behavior and the functional roles it assumes, both of which resemble the behaviors and roles of other traditional middle powers. That is, the test here is whether Korea's foreign policy behaviors and roles are commensurate with what is expected for middle powers based on behavioral and functional approaches.

The identity approach would take Korea's identification as a middle power as a shift in its foreign policy ideology. Carr (2014, 76) asks whether countries which stop identifying themselves as middle powers stop actually being middle powers. Conversely, one must question whether the rhetoric of countries that project themselves as middle powers is enough to accept them as such (Jordaan 2017, 398). Therefore, this paper

4 While there are differences among these terms, in this study they are used interchangeably due to their interchangeable use by Korean administrations.

traces since when Korea projected a middle power identity, whether it reflects its foreign policy behavior and roles and whether it represents an ideology change.

After positional, behavioral, functional and identity approaches fail to answer these questions, the paper asks the most critical question: then, why does Korea project an identity of a middle power?

This paper proposes that although previous studies (see e.g. all chapters in Lee 2016) use the behavioral approach to study Korea's middle power diplomacy, Korea's foreign policy behavior does not point to a country of middle power status. Rather, it has aspired to project the image of a middle power to improve its international status, within its region and in the world, in an attempt to improve its position in its foreign affairs vis-à-vis greater powers surrounding it and beyond.⁵ Korea's standing as a significant country in the world is assumed to help it attain its preferred outcomes, including finding partners with which to achieve common goals, to enhance its economic development and to boost the country's leverage in regional issues. In part, Korea's aspirations to project a middle power identity come from decades of being overlooked or *discounted*, because it has been relatively a small power in a region of political and economic giants (c.f. Cha and Dumond 2017).

III. Alternative Explanations for Korea's Projection of Middle Power Identity: Positional, Behavioral and Identity Approaches

There is consensus that Korea is a middle power, based on the positional approach to middle powers. Neack (1993, 350) suggests that Korea has been a middle power since at least 1960 based on her cluster analysis which uses five variables, population, GDP per capita, military expenditures per capita, infant mortality per thousand live births and the literacy rate. Even if the latter two variables were discounted, Korea would still qualify as a middle power, at least by the end of Park Chung-Hee administration and as a more significant one by the end of Cold War. In terms of GDP, Korea ranked number 23rd in the world in 1979 and 15th in 1990 (World Bank 2017). In terms of military expenditures, in 1979, Korea was among the top 25 countries; by 1990, it had risen to the top 15 (SIPRI 2018). If the positional approach's explanation was satisfactory, then Korea would have self-identified itself as a middle power and would have been acting like one at least since late the 1970s, when its population, economic and military

⁵ See Henrikson (2005) for a similar argument for Canada and Norway's cases.

capabilities had already proven to be those of a middle power. However, it had not claimed this identity until the end of the Cold War. It was as late as 1991, when President Roh Tae-Woo used the term "middle power" to describe Korea reflecting country's newly found confidence in its foreign affairs to "play a meaningful role in this promising world of change" (Roh Tae-Woo quoted in Goldman 1991, 7). It was Roh Moo-Hyun's term (2003-2008) when Korea began being more assertive in its projection of a middle power identity.

Therefore, it follows that positional capabilities are necessary as an enabling factor, but they are not sufficient for projecting a middle power identity.⁶ The positional approach's explanation of why Korea projects itself as a middle power fails the "hoop test" (Van Evera 1997, 31-32; see also Collier 2011) for which passing is a must for a theory to remain viable as an alternative explanation.

Korea's middle power diplomacy brought some niche issue areas to the forefront, which are benchmarked on the behavior of traditional middle powers. In almost every article about Korea's middle power diplomacy, the rhetoric, particularly that of the Lee Myung-Bak administration, is taken at face value as evidence of Korea's middle power behavior (see e.g. Cha and Dumond 2017; Kim 2014a; Kim 2015b; Kim 2015a; Ko 2012; Lee 2012c; Lee 2012b; Lee 2016; Nye 2009; O'Donnell 2015; Saxer 2013; Sohn 2015; Song 2016). In particular, the epistemic community behind Korea's middle power diplomacy, which centers around the East Asia Institute, prefers the behavioral approach to middle powers in their identification of Korea as one (Kim 2014b; Lee 2012b; Lee 2016). The studies that follow behavioral approach show the Korean government's rhetoric on climate action, development cooperation, bridging between developed and developing countries and its contributions to peacekeeping operations (PKO), among other issues, as evidence of Korea's middle power behavior. However, the rhetoric must not be taken for granted. George and Bennett (2005, 99-100) suggest treating "archival documents as a type of purposeful communication" on what is being communicated, "who is speaking to whom, for what purpose and under what circumstances." The aim of this section is to uncover the discrepancies between the expected story and the reality (Maoz 2002, 163) in behavioral approach to Korea's projection of a middle power identity.

One needs to take a critical look at the evidence of Korea's middle power behaviors in these suggested issue areas. However, the vast majority of research on Korea's middle power diplomacy neglects to do this, as they ignore the non-conforming evidence. This

6 For more on positional capabilities as a necessary but not sufficient factor for middle power statecraft, see Carr (2014); Cooper (2013); Lee (2012b); Saxer (2013); Schiavon and Domínguez (2016); Stephen (2013).

part of the paper challenges the behavioral approach to Korea's middle power diplomacy by using data from the same issue areas previous studies explored.

Korea's recent assertive middle power rhetoric focused on its contributions to the international community. During the Lee Myung-Bak administration, both the government and the Korean academia promoted Korea's rhetoric and behavior on green growth as one the key components of its middle power diplomacy. Under Park Geun-Hye and Moon Jae-In, the rhetoric on this topic lost momentum, as many of the governmental offices were shut down or reduced in their status (O'Donnell 2015; Pi 2017). The Office for Government Policy Coordination and Prime Minister's Secretariat's interim evaluation of the Second Green Growth 5-Year Plan (2014-2018) for the year 2016 suggests that 16 of the 20 tasks outlined in the green growth policy were only satisfactory, while only four were evaluated as "excellent" (OPC 2017, 2). Currently, Korea has the lowest share of renewable energy among OECD countries (Lee 2017, 15). In 2017, only 2.8% of Korea's total power generation was renewable energy, which is much lower than 12.2%, the average for the OECD countries (Yonhap 2018).

Furthermore, the international indices created for climate and environment protection do not suggest that Korea's behavior in this area matches its rhetoric. On the Global Green Economy Index (Tamanini 2016, 11-12), Korea's perception rank is 23rd, most possibly due to its level of economic development, but its performance ranks 46th out of 60 countries. On the Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Index (EY RECAI Team 2017), Korea ranks 29th out of 40, behind less developed countries such as Jordan and Egypt. On the Environmental Performance Index, Korea ranks 80th, and on the sub-index of climate and energy, 83rd (Hsu 2017). Furthermore, Korea's (Intended) Nationally Determined Contributions ((I)NDCs), following the Paris U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP21), suggest that it is not a leader in climate action, but maintains "business as usual" (Korean Government 2016). A comparison of countries' (I)NDCs shows that Korea is a laggard in climate action, particularly compared to other high-income countries (DIE 2018).

Korea's graduation from being an aid recipient country to become a member of the elite donor club of The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) was cited in almost every speech and document about Korea's development and foreign assistance under the Lee, Park and Moon governments. Lee Myung-Bak's Green Growth White Paper praises Korea's democratization, industrialization, economic development and its becoming the only country that has transformed from an aid recipient into an OECD DAC donor "like flowers of pink roses in a garbage pail" (Korean Government 2013, 70; see also MOFA 2017a). Korea's joining

the OECD DAC, in 2010, was part of its evolutionary process to becoming a middle power that "is eager to play a role in the international donor community that is commensurate with its economic size" (OECD 2008, 9).

The OECD statistics (2016) suggest that Korea ranks as the 17th highest net official development assistance (ODA) donor among 30 OECD countries (OECD 2018a). However, Korea's ODA/GNI (gross national income) ratio is only 0.16%, half of 0.32% OECD DAC average and less than a quarter of the UN's target of 0.7% (OECD 2018a), despite Lee Myung-Bak's promise to increase it to 0.25% by 2015 (MOFAT 2012, 213). Under Park Geun-Hye, this promise was reduced to a less ambitious level of 0.2% by 2020 and to 0.3% by 2030 while recognizing that Korea is very much behind the UN target and the DAC average (MOFA 2016, 298). Moon Jae-In's five-year action plan also shows his continued commitment to increasing Korea's ODA, in line with the less ambitious targets set by Park, for which public support was approximately 86% as of 2016 (OECD 2018b, 13).

In addition to its comparatively low ODA/GNI ratio, there are other concerns related to Korea's development cooperation practice, which is one of the linchpins of its middle power diplomacy. One is the low proportion of untied aid in Korea's ODA, which is 49%, much less than the OECD DAC average of 83.5% (OECD 2017a, 11). The 2018 OECD DAC peer review suggests that "current domestic targets on aid volume and untying are less ambitious than those previously approved, and Korea's performance falls short of its international commitments" (OECD 2018b, 18). Furthermore, Korea's ratio of multilateral aid to total aid is only 23.3%, while the OECD DAC average is around 50% (OECD 2017b). The Moon Jae-In government is determined to maintain that low ratio (ODA Korea 2018). Strategic long-term expectations from bilateral aid in the form of appreciation, attraction, visibility and credibility as the new conditionalities and the short-term economic interests play an important role in maintaining this ratio (Kalinowski and Cho 2012; Olbrich and Shim 2012; Pamment 2018).

On the one hand, ODA is seen as an important element of Korea's middle power diplomacy which the government is actively carrying forward (MOFA 2015). On the other hand, the government has been content with "small, but strong and smart" aid (MOFA 2014b). Korea's ascension to donor status within the OECD DAC has been celebrated as "a source of national pride," (Hwang 2017), but this, too, is about projecting a positive image of the country and consolidating Korea's middle power status (Committee for International Development Cooperation 2016, 3).

Although Korea's graduation from being an aid recipient to being a member of the OECD DAC is much appreciated by the international community, particularly by its

partner countries (OECD 2018b, 16), the current data on Korea's development cooperation behavior suggests that Korea has not yet established itself as a leading country in this niche. Rather, its role in the field of development cooperation fits the "merchant" type in Breuning's (1995, 237-239) typology of "foreign assistance role conception profiles," which she reserves for "smaller states."

Korea's rhetoric on playing a "bridging role between developing and developed countries" based on "its unique development experience" (MOFA 2017a; see also Cho 2012) is another significant pillar of its middle power diplomacy. In the aftermath of the 2007 global crisis, the Lee Myung-Bak administration hosted the G20 in Seoul, in 2010, where it tried to seize the opportunity to fill the gap between the developed G7 countries and developing countries, within the G20 platform, the latter which are represented by BRICS. Following the summit, Korea attempted to mediate between developed and developing countries again when it hosted the 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, in Busan in 2011. Korea hoped to leave its "fingerprint on the final statement" (Saxer 2013, 408) by establishing a development cooperation framework that emphasizes "cooperation for effective development" over "aid effectiveness" (OECD 2011, 2). Korea's advocacy for stronger "global financial safety nets" made it onto the G20 agenda in Seoul (G20 2010; see also Kalinowski and Cho 2012; Saxer 2013). Whether Korea managed to leave its fingerprints on these documents is contested by different accounts. Korea has certainly shown its aspiration and readiness for a bridging role between developed and developing countries, but it is yet to be globally acknowledged for the sustainability of this role since mediation requires the goodwill and trust of both parties.

In 2013, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia founded the informal MIKTA platform to contribute to global governance by bridging between developing and developed countries and to lessen the polarization in global policy positions (MIKTA 2015). Korea describes MIKTA as a "middle power cooperation forum" (MOFA 2017c, 90). In this initiative, Korea teamed up with "like-minded [countries that have] ... significant level of economic power ... [and share] core values and similarities ... [to] act as a catalyst or facilitator in launching initiatives and implementing global governance reform" (MIKTA 2015). The language in MIKTA's Vision Statement reflects the benchmarking of traditional middle powers which often collaborate with other similar countries in setting agendas and playing significant roles in global governance, which they could not otherwise address (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993, 19; Patience 2014, 219).

While the MIKTA initiative is certainly an important step toward making Korea's behavior match those of traditional middle powers, MIKTA is yet to move beyond being an informal platform for building confidence among member countries and "assume

a constructive role on the global stage" (MIKTA 2015). Korea, and for that matter, MIKTA's brokerage role between developed and developing countries requires earning credibility from both sides and being seen as an authority. Korea's "recipient-turned-donor" rhetoric provides it with certain expertise-based authority. However, Korea needs to address two issues regarding the sustainability of its credibility and authority in playing a bridging role in the area of development cooperation. First, Korea's "unique development experience" (MOFA 2017a), and particularly Saemaul Undong⁷, which Park Geun-Hye heavily promoted, involved authoritarian elements Korea does not embed in its Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP). Instead, what Korea exports as its development experience resembles Washington Consensus promoting neoliberal development policies (Kalinowski and Cho 2012, 251). Second, so far Korea has not been criticized much for its failure to contribute to global redistribution mechanisms as much as it should based on its economic size and power (Ayhan 2017; Kalinowski and Cho 2012). Its rhetoric on assuming responsibility in global governance must be complemented with credible commitments by increasing its ratios of ODA/GNI and untied and multilateral aid. The dilemma of the discrepancies between "the unremitting ghost of developmentalism" that bring real output expectations from foreign aid investments and humanitarian assistance must also be addressed (Kim 2017, 2). For Korea's responsible and credible middle power country image to take root, its symbolic rhetoric must be grounded in behavior (Grunig 1993).

In its PKO, Korea has increased its contributions, but it is still not significant. Korea's troop contributions to PKO is ranked 95th as of November 2017 (625 persons), and it ranks 49th in total contributions between 1990 and 2017 (94,215 persons). When we look at the period since Roh Moo-Hyun took office, from March 2003 to 2017, Korea ranked 37th in total troop contributions (69,863 persons). As for its financial contributions, Korea ranked 13th from 1994 (the first year for which data is available) to 2017 (\$21 billion).⁸

In sum, the evidence does not support the argument that Korea's foreign policy behavior in its self-declared niche areas represents that of a middle power. Hence, Korea's projection of middle power identity is not firmly based on its foreign policy

7 Saemaul Undong, or New Village Movement, was originally a rural modernization initiative of Park Chung-Hee in 1970s. It has been promoted by Korea to developing countries as a model modernization campaign. KSP aims to share Korea's development experience and best practices, including Saemaul Undong with partner countries.

8 These figures are authors' calculations based on data available at <http://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors> and IPI Peacekeeping Database <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/>

behavior as the behavioral approach explains. Similarly, the evidence does not follow the functional approach's explanation, as Korea has not mastered the roles expected of a middle power in any of the niche areas of global governance.

Besides, the identity approach regards middle power statecraft as a "foreign policy ideology," thereby suggesting that this identity can change as governments, or rather regimes, change (Hurrell 2000, 11). However, in Korea's case, the governments of Roh Tae-Woo and his successors have continuously asserted the country as a middle power. In the meantime, there has been six government changes, including three regime changes between conservative and progressive governments. The most assertive projection of a middle power identity began under the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. Successive governments have not lost this momentum, despite the two conservative administrations that followed Roh Moo-Hyun's progressive government. Consecutive Korean administrations from opposite ends of the political spectrum, have followed "creative pragmatism ... discard[ing] ideological and political rhetoric" (Chōngwadae 2009, 13) when it came to assuming and projecting a middle power identity.⁹ In short, the identity approach also fails to explain why Korea projects itself as a middle power.

This section analyzed alternative explanations of why Korea projects a middle power identity. As positional, behavioral, functional and identity approaches fail to explain this phenomenon, the next section uses the nation branding argument to answer this research question.

IV. Middle Power Diplomacy as Nation Branding

Korea's projection of middle power identity has been a nation branding project that took place particularly under Lee Myung-Bak. Lee exhibited clear purposeful communication toward the Korean citizenry, foreign governments and the international community. The government's main motivation was to project a middle power image for the country and to make up for the *Korea discount*. Its actions were to follow the image and the rhetoric, in due time.

References to Korea's middle power position and to improving Korea's standing in the world have been made since Roh Tae-Woo was in office and appeared in almost all diplomatic white papers since then. However, the projection of a middle power identity and the image of a "good international citizen" (Former Australian Prime

⁹ See Ayhan (2019) for a more detailed analysis on Korea's middle power diplomacy as not being ideological.

Minister Gareth Evans, quoted in Cooper 2013, 981) became more assertive under the Roh Moo-Hyun and Lee Myung-Bak administrations. In particular, since the later years of Roh Moo-Hyun's presidency, Korea has aspired to be associated more with the global "status community" (Renshon 2017, 44) where it plays a relatively more significant role compared to where it is situated within its immediate region. In order to consolidate its middle power status, Korea benchmarked the behavior of traditional middle powers. Following their tendency to contribute to global governance such as through ODA, sending personnel to PKO and pursuing climate action, successive Korean administrations expected these global contributions to improve the country's image and consolidate its status as a middle power. In the 2006 Diplomatic White Paper, it is stated that

If we are to play a role that is commensurate with our national power and status as the world's 10th economic great power and *improve our country's image* accordingly, we must increase our ODA to developing countries. ... The international society expects that we meet our international obligations and responsibilities that match our *international status* (MOFAT 2006, 132-133; emphasis added; see also MOFAT 2004, 297; 2007, 250).

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) report, which the presidency solicited to evaluate the Roh administration's five-year foreign policy initiatives, stated that the government has adapted well to the changes in the world "and made sure that [Korea] takes a leap as an advanced middle power country that is respected by the world" (MOFAT 2008b, 15). The same report also refers to the importance of Korea's contributions to global issues as a means to secure its national interests and consolidate the country as a middle power:

By providing aid in grants and loans consistently, we were able to secure active cooperation in the international arena based on these friendly cooperative relations. ... As a country which has been passive in the field of environment so far, we were able to *project a global image of our country and secure our national interests* by joining major worldwide environmental treaties, ... and actively participating in global issues such as climate change (MOFAT 2008b, 43, 73; emphasis added).

To project a globally responsible image of the country, Roh Moo-Hyun administration more than doubled the number of Koreans involved in the overseas volunteer corps (later renamed World Friends Korea) (KOICA 2016, 7). Furthermore, hosting the 2005 APEC Summit in Busan was also seen as an achievement that improved Korea's status

in the world (MOFAT 2008b, 38).

Building on Roh's focus on Korea's global contributions, the Lee Myung-Bak administration placed improving the country's international standing and projecting it as a responsible middle power at the center of its grand foreign policy vision. Lee's "Global Korea" strategy was an ambitious whole-government campaign that can be said to be tantamount to nation branding. This nation branding campaign associated "actively contributing to addressing international problems" with "improv[ing] Korea's image abroad" (Chǒngwadae 2009, 12-13). It was Lee Myung-Bak's conviction that "[o]nly when common prosperity is sought can hostile policies from other parties be avoided and positive synergies created" (Chǒngwadae 2009, 13).

The Lee administration emphasized the country's international contributions more than previous administrations. While earlier diplomatic white papers only mentioned the country's pursuit of international cooperation as a strategy to improve its image, in the 2008 Diplomatic White Paper, "International cooperation and improving the country's image" became a section title for the first time (MOFAT 2008a, 53). This was also the first topic raised in Foreign Minister Yoo Myung-Hwan's introductory message in the same white paper (MOFAT 2008a, 3). Lee administration used the term "contribution diplomacy" (MOFAT 2011, 20; 2012, 211, 227) to refer to its policy of active participation in global governance.

Lee Myung-Bak set Korea's vision toward becoming an "advanced top-notch country" and a "mature global country" that is "culturally attractive and internationally responsible" (Chǒngwadae 2008; see also PSFV 2010). As Korea's middle power status gradually evolved within every administration, Lee believed that "the time is now ripe for Korea to strive to become a more *dignified* country and to find its place among the *ranks of advanced nations*" (Chǒngwadae 2009, 12; emphasis added). The Global Korea policy document stated that "[t]he concept of national interest is becoming increasingly wedded to global public welfare, and a state's external *legitimacy* and leadership are thus predicated on its ability to combine the national interest with the global public welfare" (Chǒngwadae 2009, 8; emphasis added). Contributing to global governance was seen as an inexpensive way to pursue and maximize Korea's national interest (Chǒngwadae 2009, 10).

The same document suggested that Korea's contributions to global governance should not be seen as only instruments of assistance but rather as a comprehensive approach to "improving Korea's international standing" and demonstrating its potential to serve the world (Chǒngwadae 2009, 27).

While some academics and politicians consider contributions to global public goods

as altruism, a better way to put it is as "a manifestation of enlightened self-interest" (Cooper 2011, 321; see also Behringer 2013, 11). Pamment (2018) refers to such an intertwining of nation branding and aid as a soft power tool that is used as "a new conditionality" in the era of post-conditionality. This nexus between international contributions and Korea's image is evident in the policy documents and public speeches of all Korean administrations since 1990s, but more so since later years of Roh Moo-Hyun government.

Lee Myung-Bak replaced Roh Moo-Hyun administration's National Image Committee with the more empowered Presidential Council on Nation Branding (PCNB). This council was responsible for coordinating the whole-government efforts to improve Korea's status in the world in line with the vision of Global Korea. The underlying assumption was that if Korea wishes to attain the status of an advanced country and be recognized as being equal to other major countries, then it had to build its reputation in a "groundbreaking manner" so as to earn the respect of the entire international community (Lee 2008).

A 2012 report by the Lee Myung-Bak administration, entitled "Global Leadership and National Status," suggested that although Korea ranked 15th in the world, in terms of GDP, the country's image was way below that level (MCST 2013, 369). That same year, it was ranked only 33rd in the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index (NBI) report (Anholt and GfK Roper 2008). Subsequently, the PCNB set a goal to push the country's NBI ranking to 15th by 2013 (Kang 2009).

Improving Korea's image had two simultaneous objectives. First, it was meant to fight the more than century old mentality of the "Korea discount," which was seen as a major obstacle to its foreign policy initiatives. The chairman of the PCNB in an op-ed, entitled "From 'Korea discount' to Korea premium," suggested that "Korea has come a long way since Yi Jun, an emissary of Korean Emperor Gojong, was declined from observing the proceedings of the Second Peace Conference at The Hague, Netherlands, in 1907" (Euh 2010). The projection of Korea's image as a middle power, which ranks it among advanced countries, was not a place branding project that was limited to merely attracting more tourists, investors, and international students or to improving the brand equity of Korean products, although all of these were part of the deal.

Instead, improving Korea's image was seen as "important for the effective projection of power" (Chöngwadae 2009, 10) in order to "help shape an international environment" (Chöngwadae 2009, 13) that positions the country more favorably in the prestige hierarchy (Gilpin 1981; Khong 2019). Consolidating Korea's status as a middle power through nation branding was regarded as being vital to that end. If Korea were to be seen as a more significant country in terms of global governance, then its regional position would also be augmented, thereby overcoming the pejorative label *Korea discount*, even though

the policy's focus was not on security issues, per se. In other words, attaining the image of a middle power that contributes to global governance was seen as a positive externality to the realm of security, the economy and other political areas.¹⁰

Second, Global Korea also aimed to change Koreans' attitudes toward their own country. For Korea to assume the roles that are expected of middle powers, the support of the Korean public was vital because, this identity had to be constructed at home. The East Asia Institute's 2005 and 2010 national identity polls show that this identity construction had to some extent been successful. In 2010, 76.8% of Koreans described their country as a middle power and 53.1% agreed with the statement that "Korea should play a bridging role between advanced countries and developing countries" (Lee 2012b, 20). In the 2010 poll, 10% more Koreans favored sending peacekeeping personnel abroad or aiding developing countries, compared to the 2005 poll, where only 62% and 29% of Koreans supported these endeavors respectively (Lee 2012b, 20-21). The perception that Korea was not respected in the international arena significantly declined from 66.9% in 2005 to 50.5% in 2010 (Lee 2012b, 21).

Domestically, improving Korea's reputation and image also aimed to satisfy the pride of Korean constituents and, in turn, to increase the government's popularity (c.f. Lee 2009, 2010). However, the Lee Myung-Bak administration had difficulties meeting its ambitious aim of improving Korea's NBI ranking from 33rd to 15th. In order to at least satisfy its promise to Korean constituents, the PCNB and the Samsung Economic Research Institute created a new nation brand index (NBDO) in which Korea improved its rankings from 18th in 2010 to 13th in 2012 (Lee 2012a, 8).

Korea's middle power rhetoric continued to emphasize the country's contributions to global governance, thereby projecting a middle power identity under Roh and Lee's successors, Park Geun-Hye and Moon Jae-In (see e.g. MOFA 2014a, 221-310; 2017c, 123-169). Korea's listed duties as a middle power were almost identical under the three administrations that succeeded Roh Moo-Hyun and were very similar to those of Roh Moo-Hyun:

Playing a role as a responsible middle power contributing to world peace and progress by taking following actions: promoting world peace and human rights; coping with security threats; contributing to resolution of global economic problems; strengthening cooperative networks with major middle powers; promoting development cooperation

¹⁰ This phenomenon is similar to what Cull (2018) refers to as reputational security, "the degree of safety accruing to a nation state that proceeds from being known by citizens of other nations."

that gives hope to developing countries (MOFA 2013, 2017b; see also Chöngwadae 2009, 12).

The Public Diplomacy Act (2016) was enacted under Park Geun-Hye. Its aim was to make the country's public diplomacy policies more two-way, symmetrical, and in line with the recent trends in public diplomacy scholarship (Ayhan 2016). Based on the momentum created by the legal framework of this act, Moon Jae-In government suggested an "upgrade" from "public diplomacy 2.0," which emphasizes two-way symmetrical exchanges, to the "most evolved version of public diplomacy" which Ambassador for Public Diplomacy Enna Park (2017) called "public diplomacy 3.0," entailing contributions to global governance goals and the global public goods (Ayhan 2017, 17). However, the gap between Korea's foreign policy behavior and its middle power rhetoric has not changed very much under Park and Moon administrations.

V. Conclusion: Consolidating Middle Power Identity

This paper was "able to disconfirm other plausible explanations ... that generates reasonable doubt about" (Maoz 2002, 163) the hypothesis that Korea's projection of a middle power identity has been a conscious attempt to brand the nation as such.

From a positional approach, Korea has been a middle power since late 1970s and early 1908s. Indeed, Korea is a top-tier country, at least in terms of its economic and military indicators, including GDP, GDP per capita, population size, and military spending. It has transformed itself from world's one of the poorest nations to a developed country and a member of the OECD DAC and the G20.

Nevertheless, Korea's projection of a middle power identity came long after it had established its capabilities as a significant non-great power. Subsequent to Roh Moo-Hyun's presidency, Korea began to emphasize middle power diplomacy which aimed to improve the country's global image and status to make it commensurate with its ever-increasing positional capacity. The rhetoric of both Roh Moo-Hyun and Korea's consecutive administrations became assertive in their projection of Korea as a leading middle power in terms of global governance-related issues, such as climate action, development cooperation, bridging between developed and developing countries, and contributing to PKO, thereby benchmarking the behaviors and roles of established traditional middle powers. Scholars who have not critically analyzed Korea's behavior—for example, by addressing the non-conforming data—have taken this rhetoric at face value.

However, this study found that, although Korea has become increasingly more active in many of these normative and functional middle power behaviors and roles, it is yet to make a "systemic impact" (Carr 2014) on these issue areas.

This study has shown that Korea's, and for that matter other middle powers', self-declared middle power identity should not be taken for granted. Rather, each issue area where the government claims being part of its middle power diplomacy should be separately analyzed, using data on these countries' actual behavior and impact. In the case of Korea, projection of a middle power identity has mainly been a nation branding effort. It wished to improve its global image and status in order to help shape the country's international political environment as it wants.

Middle power statecraft requires that Korea fulfill its responsibilities, commensurate with its size and stated promises. If the country continues to project a middle power identity but fails to carry out the requisite foreign policy behavior, then it will not be able to avoid criticisms from the world on different issue areas.

Despite these findings, it is important to recognize that Korea's process of becoming an established middle power is an evolutionary one. While Korea is not a leading country in any of the niche areas to which it aspires, it has become increasingly more active, internationally. Korea's actual foreign policy behavior in a wide range of issues surpasses that of other small powers that focus on and lead in some niche areas while they fall behind in others. Korea's middle power statecraft, therefore, continues to evolve more in a generalist way, rather than in perfecting a particular issue area.

References

- Anholt, Simon, and GfK Roper. 2008. 2008 Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Indexsm Report Highlights. Anholt-GfK Roper.
- Ayhan, Kadir. 2016. "Introduction." In *Korea's Public Diplomacy*, edited by Kadir Ayhan. Seoul: Hangang Network.
- Ayhan, Kadir. 2017. "Korea's Soft Power and Public Diplomacy under Moon Jae-in Administration: A Window of Opportunity." In *Korea's Soft Power and Public Diplomacy*, edited by Kadir Ayhan, 13-32. Seoul: Hangang Network.
- Ayhan, Kadir Jun. 2019. "Korea's Shift from a Balancer Role to Assume Global Governance-Related Roles: Soft Power Synergy in Middle Power Diplomacy" Unpublished Manuscript.
- Behringer, Ronald M. 2013. "The Dynamics of Middlepowermanship." *Seton Hall Journal*

- of Diplomacy & International Relations* 14 (2):9-22.
- Breuning, Marijke. 1995. "Words and Deeds: Foreign Assistance Rhetoric and Policy Behavior in the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom." *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (2):235-254.
- Buhmann, Alexander. 2016. *Measuring Country Image*. Fribourg: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden.
- Carr, Andrew. 2014. "Is Australia a Middle Power? A Systemic Impact Approach." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 68 (1):70-84.
- Cha, Victor, and Marie Dumond, eds. 2017. *The Korean Pivot: The Study of Korea as a Global Power*. Washington D.C.: CSIS.
- Chapnick, Adam. 2000. "The Canadian Middle Power Myth." *International Journal* 55 (2):188-206.
- Cho, Taeyul. 2012. "Remarks by Ambassador for Development Cooperation at 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan." Accessed January 15, 2018. http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5691/view.do?seq=317399&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=6&titleNm=.
- Chöngwadae. 2008. "Gukgabiyeon 'Seonjin Illyugukga'ro Hwakjeong." Accessed January 17, 2018. http://17c wd.pa.go.kr/kr/president/news/news_view.php?uno=14&board_no=P01.
- Chöngwadae. 2009. *Global Korea: The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea*. Seoul: Cheongwadae.
- Collier, David. 2011. "Understanding Process Tracing." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44 (4):823-830.
- Committee for International Development Cooperation. 2016. *Official Development Assistance: Opening a New Era of Happiness for All Humanity*. Seoul: Committee for International Development Cooperation.
- Cooper, Andrew F. 2013. "Squeezed or Revitalised? Middle Powers, the G20 and the Evolution of Global Governance." *Third World Quarterly* 34 (6):963-984.
- Cooper, Andrew Fenton, Richard A Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal. 1993. *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Cooper, David A. 2011. "Challenging Contemporary Notions of Middle Power Influence: Implications of the Proliferation Security Initiative for "Middle Power Theory"." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7 (3):317-336.
- Cull, Nicholas. 2018. "The Quest for Reputational Security: The Soft Power Agenda of

- Kazakhstan." *USC Center on Public Diplomacy*, November 1. Accessed April 30, 2018. <https://www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/quest-reputational-security-soft-power-agenda-kazakhstan>.
- DIE. 2018. "NDC Explorer." Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Accessed February 21, 2018. <https://klimalog.die-gdi.de/ndc/#NDCExplorer/>.
- Euh, Yoon Dae. 2010. "From 'Korea Discount' to Korea Premium." *Korea Times*, 4 June. Accessed February 15, 2018. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2011/12/300_67073.html.
- EY RECAI Team. 2017. "October's RECAI Scores." Accessed January 2, 2018. <http://www.ey.com/gl/en/industries/power---utilities/ey-renewable-energy-country-attractiveness-index-our-index>.
- G20. 2010. "The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders' Declaration." Accessed January 30, 2018. <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul.html>.
- George, Alexander L, and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goldman, Geoff. 1991. "S. Korean Leader Sweeps through Stanford." *The Stanford Weekly*, 3 July, 7.
- Grunig, James E. 1993. "Image and Substance: From Symbolic to Behavioral Relationships." *Public Relations Review* 19 (2):121-139.
- Gudjonsson, Hlynur. 2005. "Nation Branding." *Place Branding* 1 (3):283-298.
- Henrikson, Alan K, ed. 2005. *Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: The 'Global Corners' of Canada and Norway*. Edited by Jan Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Holbraad, Carsten. 1971. "The Role of Middle Powers." *Cooperation and Conflict* 6 (1):77-90.
- Hsu, Angel. 2017. *2016 Environmental Performance Index*. New Haven, CT: Yale University.
- Hurrell, Andrew. 2000. "Some Reflections on the Role of Intermediate Powers in International Institutions." *Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States* 244:1-11.
- Hwang, Balbina Y. 2017. *The Limitations of "Global Korea's" Middle Power*. Seoul: The Asan Forum.
- Jervis, Robert. 1970. *The Logic of Images in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jordaan, Eduard. 2003. "The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations:

- Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers." *Politikon* 30 (1):165-181.
- Jordaan, Eduard. 2017. "The Emerging Middle Power Concept: Time to Say Goodbye?" *South African Journal of International Affairs* 24 (3):395-412.
- Kalinowski, Thomas, and Hyekyung Cho. 2012. "Korea's Search for a Global Role between Hard Economic Interests and Soft Power." *The European Journal of Development Research* 24 (2):242-260.
- Kang, Hyunkyung. 2009. "Brand Korea Plan Called Too Ambitious." *Korea Times*. Accessed January 25, 2018. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/04/116_41587.html.
- Khong, Yuen Foong. 2019. "Power as Prestige in World Politics." *International Affairs* 95 (1):119-142.
- Kim, Euikon. 2015a. "Korea's Middle-Power Diplomacy in the 21st Century." *Pacific Focus* 30 (1):1-9.
- Kim, Inkyoung. 2014a. "Messages from a Middle Power: Participation by the Republic of Korea in Regional Environmental Cooperation on Transboundary Air Pollution Issues." *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 14 (2):147-162.
- Kim, Sangbae. 2014b. Roles of Middle Power in East Asia: A Korean Perspective. In *EAI Middle Power Diplomacy Initiative*: East Asia Institute.
- Kim, Taekyoon. 2015b. South Korea's Middle-Power Diplomacy on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. In *EAI Issue Briefing*. Seoul: East Asia Institute.
- Kim, Taekyoon. 2017. South Korea's ODA Policies at a Crossroads: A New Political Opportunity for Institutional Reforms. In *EAI Issue Briefing*. Seoul: East Asia Institute.
- Ko, Sangtu. 2012. "Korea's Middle Power Activism and Peacekeeping Operations." *Asia Europe Journal* 10 (4):287-299.
- KOICA. 2016. *Hannune Ingneun 2015nyeon World Friends Korea Juyotongye*. Seoul: KOICA.
- Korean Government. 2013. *Lee Myung-Bak Jeongbu Gukjeongbaekseo: Noksaek Seongjanggwa Miraeseongjangdongnyeok*. Seoul: Korean Government.
- Korean Government. 2016. Submission by the Republic of Korea: Intended Nationally Determined Contribution. UNFCCC.
- Lee, Donghun. 2012a. "Korea" Nation Brand in 2012. Seoul: SERI.
- Lee, Geun. 2009. "A Theory of Soft Power and Korea's Soft Power Strategy." *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 21 (2):205-218.
- Lee, Geun. 2010. "The Clash of Soft Powers between China and Japan: Synergy and

- Dilemmas at the Six-Party Talks." *Asian Perspective* 34 (2):113-139.
- Lee, Myung Bak. 2008. "Address by President Lee Myung-Bak on the 63rd Anniversary of National Liberation and the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the Republic of Korea." Accessed January 23, 2018. http://17c wd.eng.pa.go.kr/pre_activity/speeches/speeches_view.php?uno=270&board_no=E03&search_key=&search_value=&search_cate_code=&cur_page_no=17.
- Lee, Sanghoon. 2017. "Energy Transition and Renewable Energy in Korea." UNESCAP, Accessed September 26, 2018. https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Session%201-6.%20Sanghoon%20Lee_GESI.pdf.
- Lee, Sook-Jong. 2012b. South Korea as New Middle Power Seeking Complex Diplomacy. In *EAI Asia Security Initiative*. Seoul: East Asia Institute.
- Lee, Sook Jong. 2012c. "South Korean Soft Power and How South Korean Views the Soft Power of Others." In *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*, edited by Sook Jong Lee and Jan Melissen, 139-161. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lee, Sook Jong, ed. 2016. *Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea's Role in the 21st Century*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Maoz, Zeev. 2002. "Case Study Methodology in International Studies: From Storytelling to Hypothesis Testing." In *Millennial Reflections on International Studies*, edited by Michael Brecher and Frank Harvey, 161-186. Ann Harbor: University of Michigan Press.
- MCST. 2013. *Lee Myung-Bak Jeongbu Gukjeongbaekseo: Geullobeol Rideoshibgwa Gukgyeok Jego*. Seoul: Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Melissen, Jan. 2005. "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice." In *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, edited by Jan Melissen, 3-27. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- MIKTA. 2015. "MIKTA Vision Statement." Accessed May 30, 2017. <http://mikta.org/about/vision.php>.
- MOFA. 2013. "2013 Policy Briefing to the President by MOFA." Accessed January 15, 2018. <http://www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/Press-Releases/view?articleId=2071>.
- MOFA. 2014a. *Waegyo Baekso 2014*. Seoul: MOFA.
- MOFA. 2014b. "[Waegyobu ODA Dongnip Paeneol], Hanguk Musangwonjoe Daehan 20gaji Jeoneul Yun Byeongse Wanggwanege Geoneui." Accessed January 12, 2018. <http://www.korea.kr/policy/pressReleaseView.do?newsId=156021009>.

- MOFA. 2015. "[Juyo Bunjaeng Jaenan Jiyeok] Indojeok Jiwon Gyeoljeong." Accessed January 12, 2018. <http://news.mofa.go.kr/ene newspaper/articleview.php?master=&aid=7317&ssid=24&mvid=2072>.
- MOFA. 2016. *Waegyo Baekso 2016*. Seoul: MOFA.
- MOFA. 2017a. "Korea's Development: History of Its Transformation." Accessed January 15, 2018. http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_5444/contents.do.
- MOFA. 2017b. "Korea's Key Diplomatic Tasks." Accessed January 15, 2018. http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_5727/contents.do.
- MOFA. 2017c. *Waegyo Baekso 2017*. Seoul: MOFA.
- MOFAT. 2004. *2004nyeon Waegyo Baekso*. Seoul: MOFAT.
- MOFAT. 2006. *2006nyeon Waegyo Baekso*. Seoul: MOFAT.
- MOFAT. 2007. *2007nyeon Waegyo Baekso*. Seoul: MOFAT.
- MOFAT. 2008a. *2008nyeon Waegyo Baekso*. Seoul: MOFAT.
- MOFAT. 2008b. *Chamyeojeongbu 5nyeon Waegyoseonggwa*. Seoul: MOFAT.
- MOFAT. 2011. *2011 Waegyo Baekso*. Seoul: MOFAT.
- MOFAT. 2012. *2012 Waegyo Baekso*. Seoul: MOFAT.
- Neack, Laura. 1993. "Delineating State Groups through Cluster Analysis." *The Social Science Journal* 30 (4):347-371.
- Nye, Joseph S. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Nye, Joseph S. 2009. "South Korea's Growing Soft Power." *Project Syndicate*, 15 November. Accessed January 15, 2018. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/south-korea-s-growing-soft-power?barrier=accessreg>.
- O'Donnell, Jill Kosch. 2015. "South Korea's Role as Host of the Green Climate Fund: Implications for Rok Contributions to Green Growth." In *Middle Power Korea: Contribution to the Global Agenda*, edited by Andrew O'Neill, Brendan M. Howe, Colin I. Bradford, Jill Kosch O'Donnell and Scott Snyder. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
- ODA Korea. 2018. "Overview." <http://odakorea.go.kr/eng.result.Overview.do>.
- OECD. 2008. *Development Co-Operation of the Republic of Korea: DAC Special Review*. Paris: OECD Development Co-operation Directorate.
- OECD. 2011. *The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation*. Busan: OECD.
- OECD. 2017a. *2017 Report on the DAC Untying Recommendation*. Paris: OECD.
- OECD. 2017b. "Development Aid Rises Again in 2016 but Flows to Poorest Countries Dip." Accessed February 21, 2018. <http://www.oecd.org/dac/development-aid-rises-Dip>.

- again-in-2016-but-flows-to-poorest-countries-dip.htm.
- OECD. 2018a. Net ODA (Indicator).
- OECD. 2018b. *OECD Development Co-Operation Peer Reviews: Korea 2018*. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Olbrich, Philipp, and David Shim. 2012. South Korea as a Global Actor: International Contributions to Development and Security. In *GIGA Focus: German Institute of Global and Area Studies*.
- OPC. 2017. *Jae2je2cha Noksaekseongjang 5gaenyeon Gyehwek ('14-'18): '16nyeondo Ihaengsiljeok Pyonggabogo*. Seoul: Office for Government Policy Coordination and Prime Minister's Secretariat.
- Pamment, James. 2018. "Towards a New Conditionality? The Convergence of International Development, Nation Brands and Soft Power in the British National Security Strategy." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 21 (2):396–414.
- Park, Enna. 2017. "Public Diplomacy of the Republic of Korea: Soft Power and the Future." Challenges & Innovations: South Korea's Soft Power, University of South California, Los Angeles.
- Patience, Allan. 2014. "Imagining Middle Powers." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 68 (2):210-224.
- Pi, Yong-Ik. 2017. "4daekang Gamsa Ieo Noksaekseongjangwi Pyeji..Mb Yusan 'Jeongjojun'." *Edaily*, 27 May. Accessed January 16, 2018. http://www.edaily.co.kr/news/news_detail.asp?newsId=01220166615933184&mediaCodeNo=257.
- Ping, Jonathan H. 2005. *Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Asia Pacific*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- PSFV. 2010. *Global Korea 2010: Gyeolgwabokoseo*. Seoul: Presidential Council for Future & Vision.
- Public Diplomacy Act. 2016. "Gonggong Waegyo Beop." Gukga Beop Jeongbo Senteo Last Modified 3 February 2016, Accessed December 1, 2016. [http://www.law.go.kr/%EB%B2%95%EB%A0%B9/%EA%B3%B5%EA%B3%B5%EC%99%B8%EA%B5%90%EB%B2%95/\(13951,20160203\)](http://www.law.go.kr/%EB%B2%95%EB%A0%B9/%EA%B3%B5%EA%B3%B5%EC%99%B8%EA%B5%90%EB%B2%95/(13951,20160203)).
- Renshon, Jonathan. 2017. *Fighting for Status : Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Riddell, R. G. 1948. *The Role of Middle Powers in the United Nations, Statements and Speeches* 48/ 40. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs.
- Robertson, Jeffrey. 2017. "Middle-Power Definitions: Confusion Reigns Supreme." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 71 (4):355-370.
- Saxer, Carl J. 2013. "Capabilities and Aspirations: South Korea's Rise as a Middle Power."

- Asia Europe Journal* 11 (4):397-413.
- Schiavon, Jorge A, and Diego Domínguez. 2016. "Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA): Middle, Regional, and Constructive Powers Providing Global Governance." *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies* 3 (3):495-504.
- SIPRI. 2018. *SIPRI Extended Military Expenditure Database*. Stockholm: SIPRI.
- Sohn, Yul. 2015. "Searching for a New Identity: South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy." *Policy Brief* 212:1-6.
- Song, Jaeik. 2016. "Reinforcing of PKO of R.O.K. As Middle Power: Focus on Changing in UN's International Peace Operation." *HangukGunsahakNonchong* 9 (0):231-256.
- Stephen, Matthew. 2013. "The Concept and Role of Middle Powers During Global Rebalancing." *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy & International Relations* 14:36.
- Tamanini, Jeremy. 2016. *The Global Green Economy Index™ Ggei 2016: Measuring National Performance in the Green Economy*. Washington D.C.: Dual Citizens LLC.
- Teo, Sarah. 2017. "Middle Power Identities of Australia and South Korea: Comparing the Kevin Rudd/Julia Gillard and Lee Myung-Bak Administrations." *The Pacific Review*: 1-19.
- Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Random House.
- Wang, Jian. 2006. "Managing National Reputation and International Relations in the Global Era: Public Diplomacy Revisited." *Public Relations Review* 32 (2):91-96.
- World Bank. 2017. "Databank: World Development Indicators." Accessed January 23, 2018. <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.CD&country=#>.
- Yonhap. 2018. "S. Korea Relies Heavily on Nuclear, Coal to Generate Electricity: Report." Accessed September 28, 2018. <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2018/09/04/0200000000AEN20180904002800320.html>.

Received 26 September 2018

Received in revised form 21 January 2019

Accepted 31 January 2019